Indonesia-China’s Future Bilateral Relations: Response to Natuna Conflict
Written by Hafizha Dwi Ulfa
The lengthy discussion of the South China Sea dispute is entering a new phase for ASEAN member countries and China. Since China’s claims to the islands in the South China Sea in 1974, China has considered the South China Sea as its territorial sovereignty. The South China Sea and a number of islands in it are still a dispute between China and Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, to Malaysia.
While for Indonesia as a country surrounded by sea bordering with other countries, the South China Sea conflict will have an impact on the system of drawing a straight line or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf that will make Indonesia one of the vulnerable countries to become one dispute party. Especially with the Natuna issue which is feared to be an open dispute between China and Indonesia.
The Natuna sea is within 200 nautical miles (370 kilometers) of Indonesia’s coastline, making it part of Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Since December 19, 2019, Chinese fishing vessels have trespassed into the waters around the Natuna Islands, violating Indonesia’s sovereignty as regulated by the 1982’s United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The violations committed by China against Natuna is not the first time. Most recently, on December 24, 2019, China again violated Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in Natuna waters, including Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing activities.
Indonesia as ASEAN member country always responds that all related parties can exercise restraint and respect international law in behaving the South China Sea. Indonesia’s link in responding to this issue is to maintain the Southeast Asia region and the South China Sea’s security stability itself. Indonesia has a commitment to continue to encourage the creation of a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality in the region.
Therefore, Indonesia should keep pushing for a peaceful diplomatic solution to this dispute so that Indonesia lodged a diplomatic protest to Beijing in response to reported territorial violations by up to three China Coast Guard and approximately 63 fishing vessels in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ ) around the Natuna Island. The Indonesian government emphasizes four main points in the Natuna conflict.
First, there have been violations by Chinese vessels in the Indonesian EEZ region. Second, Indonesia’s EEZ region has been determined by international law through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982). The formation of Indonesia’s maritime territory began on December 13, 1957, by the then Prime Minister of Indonesia, Djuanda Kartawidjaja through the “Juanda Declaration”. The Djuanda Declaration expresses that Indonesia adheres to the principles of an archipelagic state so that inter-island seas are also the territory of the Republic of Indonesia and not a free zone. The Djuanda Declaration in 1982 was finally accepted and adopted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982.
Third, China is one part (member) of UNCLOS 1982. The Law of the Sea Convention was accepted by all members of the United Nations and has come into force because it has been ratified by many countries. Therefore it is an obligation for China to respect, implementation of UNCLOS 1982. Fourth, Indonesia will never recognize the Nine-Dash Line, a one-sided claim made by China that does not have legal reasons recognized by international law especially UNCLOS 1982. Indonesia also rejects the term ‘relevant waters’ claimed by China because this term is unknown and does not comply with UNCLOS 1982. Based on UNCLOS 1982, Indonesia does not have overlapping claims with China so there is no relevant dialogue whatsoever about maritime boundary delimitation.
Indonesia takes this step in accordance with the provisions of Indonesia and ASEAN regarding the South China Sea which is always the same and consistent, with prioritizing the best peaceful solutions through the Declaration of Conduct (DoC) within the framework of the Code of Conduct (CoC), and CoC negotiations. This was done to maintain security stability in the Southeast Asian region and ASEAN dialogue partner countries, which are operating in accordance with ASEAN Way rules.
The continuing assertiveness of Beijing has the potential to worsen Indonesian-Chinese relations, relations that have long been characterized by ambiguity and mistrust. This could also trigger a hard line by the main ASEAN countries, led by Indonesia, related to the South China Sea problem. Ultimately, Indonesia’s stance is well aligned with Australia’s strategic goals and the Indo-Pacific partner (The Quadrilaterals), which are looking for limits to Beijing’s coercive power. So, it can benefit The Quad who is against China.
Therefore, Indonesia needs to be very careful in taking steps on this issue to maintain regional stability, maintain Indonesia-China relations, and of course, maintain Indonesia’s sovereignty. Indonesia’s current step through peace diplomacy has shown quite positive results, considering that both China and Indonesia recognize the importance of maintaining their relationship in economic prosperity and mutual security. Strengthening Indonesia’s dialogue on the ASEAN, economy, and the Indo-Pacific is expected to reduce Natuna’s tensions and prevent this from happening again.
What Indonesia is doing now will determine the future of Indonesia’s relations with China regarding the Natuna conflict and the South China Sea conflict with ASEAN. China cannot impose its will in the South China Sea claim, and vice versa ASEAN must maintain regional peace in accordance with its credibility as a stable region in Southeast Asia. ASEAN must be able to reinforce its position in dealing with the South China Sea conflict by strengthening dependency between ASEAN partner countries. The aim is clearly to maintain world peace. This world full of uncertainty, But just let’s be optimistic that’s ASEAN can balance this world's perceptiveness.
Sources:
Severino, Rodolfo C. (2010). ASEAN and the South China Sea, Security Challenges, Vol. 6. Accessed on 14 Mei at 20.05 WIB. https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Documents/vol6no2Severino.pdf
Thayer, Carlyle A. (2013). ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 33, Number 2, Summer-Fall, pp. 75–84, The Johns Hopkins University Press. Accessed on 14 Mei at 20.10 WIB http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/44163/ssoar-jas20142ramadhaniChinas_Crisis_Bargaining_in_the.pdf?sequence=2
Thayer, Carlyle A. (2013). South China Sea Developments in 2013: ASEAN Unity Restored, Sino-Philippine Tensions and ASEAN-China Consultations on a Code of Conduct. International Workshop on the South China Sea. Vietnam
Tonnesson, Stein. (2001). An International History of the Dispute in South China Sea. EAI Working Paper No. 71. Accessed on 14 Mei at 20.10 WIB. http://www.cliostein.com/
